The Mediterranean and the Dilemma of the Roman Empire in Late antiquity
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INTRO KEY POINTS

·        Interdependence Byzantium and Sassanian Persian Empire that meant West and East drifted apart. 

·        Justinian wars of reconquest doomed to failure as broke symbiotic relationship with Persia in the Fertile Crescent 5^th century.  War east and west – weakened both B and SP helped triumph Islam early 7^th.

PIRENNE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

·        Roman empire fundamentally a Mediterranean power – Augustlus saying go no further, but 14 CE not much more gained.

·        Pirenne: vital link between Eastern an Western parts.  Islam causing crisis which disrupted flow of trade between the two – critically hurting the West. Moves back on economic and cultural resources – shifts centre of gravity northwards to central Europe and Rhine

·        Mediterranean very important – even name implies closeness and familiarity (mare nostrum).

THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE LITERARY TRADITION OF THE ROMAN WORLD

·        Roman that rules orbis terrarum empire expansion dealt a blow to this.  Concept of physical entity of Mediterranean but little of economic significance etc.

·        Epositio totius Mundi – Constantinius II 350 and 355 – relatively good description of the Roman world.

THE MARE NOSTRUM AS AN ECONOIC, POLITICAL AND CULTURAL ENTITY IN GREEK AND LATIN SOURCES

·        Polybius – certain bias towards the land, army battles etc, domination Mediterranean 4 centuries and economic benefits taken for granted.  Seamanship and commerce taken for granted.

·        Cicero’s pro lege manilia recognition sea as vital to Roman empire – Velleius Paterculus more general attitude – place were campaign was waged and won.

·        Classical works vindicate Pirenne’s view that Mediterranean Empire, differing explanations of its benefits and importance.

THE VANDALS AND THE DECLINE OF MEDITERRANEAN NAVIGATION

·        439 Gaiseric an Vandals conquer Carthage with a fleet they had been using for destructive raids on Sicily. Romans try to make agreements with Gaiseric, he broke, and 3 unsuccessful expeditions to try and get it back.

·        Persistently pillaged Sicily in fifties and sixties 0 took land Sardinia, Baleari, Corsica etc.  Rome in 455.  Eventually put down by Justinian in 533 huge fleet, not naval power, but land logistics.

·        Rouge - Gradual decline shipping in Med from 3^rd century  - decline before Vandals foregone conclusion.  Linked to virtual disappearance of effect military fleet. Capable of policing the waters.  Vandals, with piracy, step into this vacuum.

·        Hodges and Whitehouse – show some trade, maybe small flotillas but re-emergence of trade end 5^th century coincides with Vandal peace – Justinian’s wars of reconquest that really slowed trade

·        Vandal domination of Western waters was a political and military problem, not an economic or commercial one – linked to decline in Med. Navigation as this allowed Vandals to operate without obstruction at sea.  Economic point of view Justinian’s war entirely indispensable – peace with Vandal realm contributed to relative prosperity under Anastasius in B. and Theoderic in West at turn 5^th century.

·        Long run – military and political view Eastern emperors, imbued with Roman heritage, could not take peace and stability of Eats procured at expense of cessation of its stern part to forces beyond Constantinople’s control.

·        Vandals more of a psychological factor – like piracy on BCE – sharpened awareness of importance Mediterranean in minds of people who dreamt of Roman unification.

·        Justinian: intolerable dilemma - urge to reconquer Empire greater than political convenience.  Attempt to reconquer tore apart economic fabric of Mediterranean basic.  West suffered first but then East itself suffered, vulnerable to attacks from neighbours.

·        Sassanid Persians still most dangerous enemy.  B relations with SP and commitments in MB totally linked – made a confrontation between these two great power os late antiquity entirely unavoidable.

BYZANTIUM BETWEEN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND FERTILE CRESCENT

·        The Peace with Persia and the Division of the Mediterranean Basin

·        When West and East drifting apart in 5^th century – East longest spell peaceful relations with greatest rival Sassanid Persia.

·        384 CE – Theodosius I and Shapur II 0 partition of the Armenian buffer state between Rome and Persia. Removal grievous bone of contention allowed T to concentrate on two usurpers in the west and consolidation of his control.

·        Yet Barbarian invasions – East does not utilize peace to help West.  Tensions yes, but death of Arcadius and Stilicho should have stopped this – lack of initiative and inertia even when Theodosius II ascended the throne.

·        Pressure of barbarians on East?  No evidence of many measures taken against them – Attila only focussing on East because reached agreement with West who could not beat him without East.

·        Paradox – three decades after resumption hostilities between Byzantium and Persia – after he had patched up a shaky peace with Chosro I, purpose leaving Justinian free to deal with Vandals, gave little hope of respite ended for Western enterprise.

·        Bias sources but clear Persians mainly kept to their treaties and Romans failure to do so in 420-22 and 441-42 caused Roman lack of fulfilment for promises.

·        Dilemma: relative peace and stability for its Eastern part at expense of virtual abandonment of the Mediterranean basin, or involvement in West leading to costly wars with Sassanids at least convenient moments.

THEODOISUS II, YAZDGARD I AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

·        420 Crisis – followed 2 decades of peace with Yazdgard I (399 – 420) – not liked did not have booty or war to keep nobility happy. Important allies in Saracen princes of al-Hira – relies on military powers (dismay of nobility).  Also possibility of diplomatic subsidies from Rome

·        Yazdgard played an important role in making sure Theo II, after Arcadius will, got to throne in 408, seems unlikely Byzantine would have initiated any friction with Persian king.  But yes – Byzantine government to use Christian missions to entice Persian Saracen vassals to transfer allegiance to Western Empire.

·         422 Treaty between Theodosius II and Bahram I- both agreed not to accept Saracen rebels in event of revolt

·        Yazdgard persecuting Christians only toward end of his reign – lively missionary activity within Persian Empire was provocation.  Rome then accepts Saracen tribes pretext could not refuse Christians asylum.  War 421-22 breaks out when Thoe’s government refuses to send back refugees – yaxdgard and successor Bahram V.

·        Why did Romans try to reinforce defensive system with Saracens against peaceful neighbour?  Persian simply reacting to Roman rule.  Universal political power should not depend on goodwill of another with similar pretensions.  Policy of disengagement from any semblance of such dependence.  Supplies of men depleted in Byzantium – risks playing with fire

·        Also theory that East wanted Mediterranean basin as secure – needed total Persian border security independently of Persian goodwill.

THE CRISIS OF 441-42 AND THE BYZANTINE POLITICAL DILEMMA

·        One of most difficult moments for East and surviving Western empire.  Gaiseric holds Carthage, danger whole Mediterranean.  Val III shows helplessness, complete trust placed in “our Father Theodoisius” – lack of naval power.

·        Impressive army sent but only to Sicily – Gaseric bad on pea negotiation but makes move for peace, strange didn’t exploit this.

·        Eastern force withdraws from Sicily? Why?  Persian invasions in Syria, Cappadocia ad Roman Armenia – only went because of peace – needed military power to return to respond to Persians – Hunnic invasion Illricum later.

·        Timing of Persians, Huns and Vandals to converge at same time as East help West – no evidence.  Persians because C doesn’t obey treaties

·        Why invade?  Disagreement over defence Caspian Gates – Romans supposed to help pay, but Persia did it all, and continued refusal led to invasions.

·        War breaks out on frontier at inopportune moment due to failure to abide by agreement at time gigantic effort to free West from Vandal piracy

THE MEDITERRANEAN AND FINANCIAL LIABILITES TOWARDS PERSIA

·        Clear paid 30,000 soldi a year to Persia (Syriac Chronicle of Joshua Stylites, Menander Protector – until 562- very unwise not to pay this at time of going to war with much larger sums.  Negligible amount in comparison – now wonder Persians went to war.

·        Must have been something else in these payments.

·        532 – Justinian pays 110,000 pounds of gold for allegedly eternal peace – advance payment of 264 years.  20 years later, after 10 of war, much more demands

·        502-6 war initiated by Anastasius’ refusal to grant Kawad 1 loan.

·        Advance payments – when Persia in need or pressure might be bought to bear + diplomatic costs, made alliance unattractive.

·        441-442 – T2 under pressure from Huns in north, great expedition of war and see why not afford want to pay Persian esp Yadzgard insistence on advance payments - decision intelligible.

·        Psychological effects – we see Firdawsi’s Shahnameh seeing payments as a tribute (Persian propaganda) – Joshua Stylites has to say not a tribute.

·        Not surprising that they were never safe to aid the west – when were Persians going to come up with an excessive demand?  Paying demands tarnished reputation as giving in to Persia – but war more costly.  Attempts by end of Yazdgard to create a defence system autonomous of Persian influence, at whatever cost, attempts to resist payment and compliance.

ATTEMPTS AT DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE ALLAINCE WITH PERSIA

·        Attempts at disengagement seen as provocation as much as non-payment.

·        Prior to Treaty of Sporacius 441-442 – neither party to build fortifications on border.  Persians want this clause, even in 5^th century.

·        Theodosiopolis fortified by T2 – miraculously recovered from siege – accordance 384?  Theodosiopolis as a key stronghold of complex defence system in Roman Armenia – part and parcel of garrison system along Armenian border.  Treaty of 442 shows Persian not keen on its rebuilding, breach of treaty.  Another aspect of policy enticing Saracens to cross into Byzantine soil – occurrences of 439 – 42.  Mediterranean outlook which formed basis of policy.

MARCIAN AND LEO I BETWEEN EPRSIA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

o       Marcia 450 – 57 – little threats.  Hun gone and taken to task for not doing anything against Vandals, when Gaiseric inflicts damage to Eternal City only minor remonstrations.  No indication of subsidies paid, may have not paid a penny.  Peace financially beneficial – left 100,000 of gold in Imperia treasury – could peace have lasted longer?

o       Leo I – 457 – 74 – experiences dilemma – diplomatic delegations treated with arrogance – 464 delegation with Patricius Tatianus no audience – no Emperor could stand for this.

o       Symbolic at time situation in West deteriorating that strong diplomatic demands from the Persians 0 Piruz (459 – 84) in 464 demands better help in Caspian Gates and money for Kidarite Huns – advance payment.

o       Leo I difficult to accede esp. with imminent expedition to the West.  Constantinius sent and differing reports- some say he got away without payment (Priscus disagrees).  Josuhua Stylites says paid for Kidarite Huns – Leo chooses to pay esp. with memories of 41-42.

o       467 expedition disastrous – lack naval power rank and file, poor leadership, possibly treason, surely not helped y indecision resulting from ambiguous settlement in Persian area.

o       Huge cost: 65K Gold, 700K silver – not only cause – payments of Zeno (474-91).  When Zeno and Anastasius avoid payments in their reigns (due to Kawad internal difficulties) results were noticeable. Lydus estimates an Anastius surplus of 10,000 K gold surplus.  Why? Prudence, lack of military activity and lack of payment to Persians.

o       Dilemma clearly framed – Marcian: Eastern empire might enjoy Economic prosperity and relative peace price complete abandonment Roman imperial tradition.  West:  East take slight by Barbarian monarchs until have to give up any suzerainty over cradle of Roman Empire.  Sooner or later East become virtual satellite Persia – tribute payer.  Centre of gravity Fertile Crescent.

o       Leo’s policy of turning toward Mediterranean impossible choice with alliance with Persia - disengagement at price Byzantinium hardly afford.

ANASTIASIUS BETWEEN PERSIA AND MEDITERRANEAN

·        Not Marcian tradition, contrary doing as much as possible to keep traditional link with west.

·        West kept peace with Vandals – Odoacar gone in last year Zeno by Ostrogths under Theodric – Anastasius recognised him as regent to Byzantium 0 peace and quiet in West – credulous an optimistic see entire Med basin as unified under Byzantine suzerainty.

·        Balance in West delicate – ephemeral and fickle Barbarian Kings who only just supported him – we see attempt to disengage alliance.  Hazardous game letting payments fall into arrears and fortifying places like Daras and Theodosiopolis.  Contravenes agreements with Kawad.

·        Zeno declines subsidies by 483 120 yr tenure of Nisibis had elapsed and return to Rome.  Deserves little credence as no mention in Ammaniaus of 363 treaty.

·        As Anastasius says – wars are not trifling with the West and predecessor does not pay subsidies..  Anasatasius and followers dilemma: absorption into Persian Empire based in Fertile Crescent or reconstruction of shattered Mediterranean Empire – only lead to long and costly wars.

EPILOGUE: JUSTINIAN AND THE RECONQUEST OF THE MEDITERRANEAN

·        532 – Justinian tries to break loose from circle – enormous um money to East – beats Vandals and then contends with Ostrogoths and Persian almost simultaneously. Did he know it was a Mediterranean based empire saving?

·        Time and time again Byzantine mastery of the sea mentioned – advantages over Goths.

·        Rouge conc. That Roman naval power in Med disappeared 0 as wars dragged on thalassokratia exposed as mirage – East could not afford expensive naval outings to the Med as wars in west dragged on.  Justinian’s army trapped on mainland without supplies.

·        Successors abandon West – new civilisation in West, not because Med blockaded, East could not take advantage of it, Babas rudimentary eco. Dev that unable to embark of grand commerce there without Byzantine stimulation.

·        Byzantine reaping poisonous harvest of dilemma – northern frontier Avars and Slavs and east great powers letting blood until triumphant advent of Islam.

Other Notes in this Category

1. Ancient Cities
2. Carolignian Period
3. Charles the Bald
4. Chronology of Byzantium and Persia
5. Dynasty of Theodosius I and Barbarians in the West
6. French and British Agriculture
7. Islamic Conquests up to 700 a.d. - Islamic Strenghts / Roman Weaknesses?
8. Islamic Conquests up to 700 a.d. - Islamic Strenghts / Roman Weaknesses?
9. MOHAMMED, CHARLEMAGEN AND THE ORIGINS OF EUROPE
10. New Centres of Power in the 8th and Ninth Century
11. Peace and War - Rome and Persia - 5-7th Centuries
12. Practice Questions
13. The Age of Attila
14. The Decline of the Ancient World
15. The Mediterranean and the Dilemma of the Roman Empire in Late antiquity
16. Warfare
17. Was successful Kingship in Merovingian Gaul simply a matter of being an effective and lucky war leader?
18. Why did the western empire fall when the east survived?

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