Social Liberty and Free Agency – some ambiguities in Mill’s conception of freedom: by G.W. Smith
Bookmark this page

-         Was Mill a Positive or Negative Libertarian?:

-         1.  The Principle of Liberty: JSM often regarded as a –ve libertarian on grounds that P of L is a –ve principle defining an area of non-interference – unhelpful: ‘the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self protection’  (chap 1) – says that this statement of the P of L clearly +ve rather than negative, in that it warrants interference with others’ freedom on the condition that it is only for self-protection.  (‘Of course, may equally be formulated negatively, but it indicates that the issue is basically a verbal one’ – so answer not to be found in P of L).

-         Question thus hinges upon the kind of concept of freedom applied within the P of L.  Hence the question can’t be limited to On Lib.  Worth drawing from the System of Logic, An examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy, and Principles of Political Economy.  But start with On Lib:

-         2.  A fallacious predisposition: predisposition to read JSM as a –ve libertarian, because he is apparently situated so obviously in the tradition of 19^th cent British liberalism, which, with exceptions, was bound with an empiricist and negative concept of liberty. 

-         What JSM explicitly says about freedom when he lays down his principle: in almost the same sentence in which he formulates the principle (chap 1), he mentions, as impediments to ‘liberty of action’, ‘compulsion’, ‘physical force in the form of legal penalties’, and ‘the moral coercion of public opinion’, all suggesting that freedom of action to be construed as (roughly) ‘absence of external impediments on an agent’s doing what he wants to do’. 

-         Berlin: ‘Mill believes in lib, that is, the rigid limitation of the right to coerce, cos. he’s sure that men can’t develop & flourish & become fully human unless they’re left free from interference by other men with a certain minimum area of their lives, which he regards as – or wishes to make – inviolable.

-         If there’s any single theme running through On Lib, it’s surely that ‘self-dev’ (or as JSM usually calls it in essay: ‘Individuality’) can’t be realised without ‘freedom and variety of situations’ (chap 3). 

-         In his ‘Two concepts of liberty’ Berlin attributes to JSM ‘a definition of negative liberty as the ability to do what one wishes’. 

-         Smith says that Berlin’s position that the effective notion of freedom actually at work in On Lib reflects JSM’s distinctive convictions about human nature & needs.  Hence, it’s freedom qua freedom of choice (human), and not freedom as merely unfrustrated want-satis (all animals), that (on Berlin’s own principles) makes sense of JSM’s claim that P of L a necessary means to individuality – implicitly recognises absurdity of a narrow negative definition of freedom in the context of JSM’s actual purposes in On Lib, but without attributing to him wild oscillation between two diametrically opposed ideas of liberty. 

-         Might be argued that freedom qua freedom is fundamentally a –ve conception of freedom, but this ignores complication that infants, insane, and ‘backward’ people excluded. 

-         System of Logic: Mill takes issue with Robert Owen’s social determinism, & attempts to reconcile universal determinism with human freedom, where human freedom connotes to simply absence of external frustration but, more positively, human self-mastery.  Expressed succinctly, though JSM a determinist, argued that amongst most imp. causal antecedents were what in Sys of Log he called ‘self-dev’, ‘self-amendment’ & ‘self-mastery’ (all close synonyms of the ‘individuality of On Lib) – i.e. the desire on our part to do so.  Though admits that we can’t determine our own characters, we can find here the essence of JSM’s idea of liberty, both metaphysical & moral; his central concern is to show how men can be free as agents capable of claiming, & admitting, autonomous responsibility for their desires, & hence their actions.  Individualist of On Lib, who develops his character to the point where his desires peculiarly ‘his own’, cos. he’s moulded it more than others, exemplifies precisely the type of agent-freedom whose possibility JSM strives to demonstrate in his attack on Owenite fatalism (i.e. part of motivation for Social lib stems from his ideas on metaphysical liberty – but he says this isn’t the case at beg of essay)

-         Mill’s conception of Liberty: Positive in 4 main respects:

-         1. Involves what Berlin holds to be a crucial element in all +ve versions of freedom: self-mastery or self-determination.

-         2. Rather than mere absence of impediments to action, it’s a matter of the possession of abilities & powers for self-dev.

-         3. Self-dev clearly valuable to JSM – nothing ‘value-neutral’ about the notion, as there is about freedom qua uncoerced want-satis, whatever they might be for.

-         4. Impediments to self-mastery explicitly mentioned by JSM are ‘internal’ rather than ‘external’ – psychological defects of character such as weakness of will or subjection to habit, not coercion by others

-         But Negative in 2 important respects:

-         1. Actual achievement of self-mastery not a condition of freedom.  Conformist, lazy or vicious, may still on this definition be free.  JSM insists that we may ‘yield to temptation’ & remain free – just so long as we could resist, if we wished.  Freedom thus remains basically liberal in that it’s a matter of enjoying opportunities rather than of actual positive achievements.

-         2. Cos. the actual attainment of JSM’s ideal of personality dev isn’t presented as a necessary condition of freedom, he manages to sustain a distinction, often held dear by orthodox liberals, between liberty – the opportunity to do something arising from the possession of the requisite powers – and what makes freedom useful/valuable: the actual doing of that thing. 

-         Clearly, the dichotomy of either –ve or +ve freedom simply misleading when applied to such a notion. 

-         Wants to protect esp. those capable of forming their own personalities, but who are likely to feel inhibited by prospect of social disapproval.  Gives them a sphere of action for ‘experiments of living’. 

-         This conception of freedom also squares with:

-          liberty qua ‘letting people pursue their own good in their own way’ (Chap 1), &

-         Orthodox liberal view of the proper function of the state, with which Mill’s usually associated, i.e. as protecting or conserving a freedom which individuals are presumed already to possess. 

-         A Central Problem with JSM’s Conception of Freedom:  contended that the basic flaw in JSM’s theory of freedom lies in his admission that ‘the will to alter our own character is given to us, not by any effort of ours, but by circumstances we can’t help: it comes to us from external causes, or not at all’.  If we can’t actually determine our own character unless we actually desire to do so, and is the desire for self-mastery can’t (as JSM admits) be self-induced, are we not all heteronomously motivated, and hence by his own criterion unfree? – But this means that if the desire for self-reform can’t be self induced, external (i.e. social) circumstances which either stimulate or inhibit its development take on crucial significance in the indiv’s engagement for self-development.  (evidence of JSM’s understanding of this to be found in his comment that Owen’s account of human impotence might ‘depress’ or ‘paralyse’ the will of someone trying to engage in character self-reform, or stop someone from even trying cos. thinks he’ll fail. 

-         G.W. Smith argues that JSM is in effect operating with a three-factor conception of freedom, one positive, and two negative.  ‘Complete freedom’, as he calls it, presupposes:

-         (a.) Possession of the capacity to alter one’s character, if one wishes.

-         (b.) Absence of impediments upon the exercise of this capacity when one does wish to exercise it.

-         (c.) Absence of conditions inhibiting the occurrence of the desire so to do.

-         A – developed by JSM in response to Owen’s social fatalism – an attempt at a solution for metaphysical prob of ‘free will’

-         B – everything JSM says in On Lib about dangers of coercive social opinion to freedom implies that he takes external constraints as relevant too. 

-         C – where his worries about the peculiarly modern threat to freedom really takes form.  It’s this condition which bears fundamentally upon the P of L in On Lib. 

-         JSM believed (following Tocqueville), feature of democ. ‘souls’ ‘enslaved’ by modern society – socially manufactured conformists who have been trained to want only what society is prepared to permit them to do – so well drilled in psychological responses that, as JSM says (chap 3) ‘it does not occur to them to have any inclination, except what is customary’.  When no variety of lifestyles & variety frowned upon, there can’t be emulation of individuality, & hence no stimulation of the desire for self-dev.

-         How the theory works: The power (a.), the opportunity for its exercise (b.), and the desire to do so (c.) are nec & sufficient conditions for complete freedom, as JSM understands it. 

-         C: Telling on JSM’s view of human nature: for much of On Lib, optimistic: simply assumes that it’s quite natural for humans to want actively to shape and mould their own personalities.  On the other hand, from time to time qualifies optimism: then individuality only appears in unusually propitious (lucky) social circumstances which stimulate average indiv out of apathy. 

-         The Importance of Optimism to the Coherence of JSM’s Position: very imp.: represents the psychological axiom by which he manages to square his far from orthodoxly liberal concept of freedom with the liberal orientation of P of L.   (Princip applies most naturally as a conservative instrument designed to preserve freedom assumed to be possessed by most citizens

-         How the theory works –depends on human nature?  Logic of the operation of principle fairly limpid when it’s assumed that agents already fulfil conditions (a.) and (c.), for then the P of L simply serves to guarantee the fulfilment of (b.) But if condition (c) isn’t the case, problem of creating the appropriate social atmos for the pursuit of freedom by countering apathy: JSM thinks people (apart from ‘backward’ kids & retards) must be assumed to be capable of being influenced by reason/persuasion).   

-         Another Misconception on JSM: to say that Mill is committed to a conventional liberal conception of freedom due to language used in On Lib (my point) ignores the fact that it is because people JSM believes that most people are capable of being educated up to individuality through example & exhortation that JSM gives the misleading impression that, like unreconstructed liberals, he takes freedom to be a matter of doing what one wishes without coercive interference. 

-         Why GW Smith thinks JSM isn’t all that liberal: says it’s evident that Mill regards the achievement of self-dev as no common or easy thing.  Many will fail entirely in the face of such difficulties.  (Smith cites how JSM says in Utilitarianism how capacity for nobler feelings ‘easily killed’ – hmm – I’m not so convinced…)

-         Argues that the function of liberty principle, given that JSM so pessimistic about most people’s ability to attain self-dev, must be basically that of protecting the fortunate minority who still have liberty to lose by curbing the activities of the majority who have none.  Admits that pessimism enters On Lib only sporadically.  Argues that fragile coherence between JSM’s genuinely liberal instincts and complex & ambiguous concept of freedom kept maintained by vagueness and optimism about human nature.  When JSM’s confidence in the educability of human nature falters, the illiberal conclusions follow of necessity; an embarrassment of which he remains essentially unaware.

Other Notes in this Category

1. Jane O’Grady’s Introduction to On Liberty
2. John Stuart Mill and Isaiah Berlin – The ends of life and the preliminaries of morality: by Richard
3. John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life: by Isaiah Berlin
4. John Stuart Mill’s Art of Living: by Alan Ryan
5. Mill’s Conception of Happiness & the Theory of Individuality: by John Gray
6. Mill’s Defence of Liberty: by C.L. Ten
7. Social Liberty and Free Agency – some ambiguities in Mill’s conception of freedom: by G.W. Smith

Didn't find this useful?

• Visit Coursework.Info for over 14,000 GCSE, A-Level and University Essays