Elements of Failure and Endurance
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• 18 yrs to find property strategy for Persians – not the same for wars with the Muslims.  Initial invasions surprised the military defenders and civilians of Syria and Palestine – no suspecting Arabs at all.
• Could he have developed a better strategy? Unsuccessfully developed a variant strategy of positional warfare – defence in depth.  Lack of mobile forces and coordination.  Achievements in 610 and 628 – 30s was a failure.
• Consciously destroyed border areas along southern border – no man’s land
• War seldom waged war maximal intensity – slow motion warfare
• Byzantines never imagined need for border with Arabs – draw back line eventually Taurus Mountains, could have been further forward.
• Byzantine – Muslim frontier emerges as part of conditions of conquest and truce arrangements in Syria
• Muslims did not allow foes to have truces except extremely advantageous to Muslims – complex combination of diplomatic and military initiatives and threat coordinated and tended to reinforce each other.  Made contact with local civilians
• Heraclius wants some frontier without involvement massive battle engagements in open country.  Seizing of passes helped create frontier –
• Muslims couldn’t get handle on Anatolian plateau through Taurus Mountains – plan to draw away major Byzantine leaders whom they expected to swap loyalty – never achieved degree of success.  Totally dependent on military solutions.
• First 3 civil wars 656-61, 680-92, 747-51 – drastically hampered Muslim’s offensive ability and ability to pursue owns strategic program.   Sieges of Constantinople 674-8, 717-8 high points, first Muslim civil war seriously arrests growing military momentum of Muslims.
• Mu’awauya offensive campaigns mainly raids into Anatolia – even up to 1000 kms into Anatolia – added prestige, also enriched Muslims, attracted more tribesmen and seriously harmed Byzantines.  Kept them off balance.
• No strategic gain but wasted Byzantine time by making them concerned with counter measures – Muslim pressure on Anatolia, Cyprus and other Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean islands smoothed way for Muslim attainment another goals – eventual conquest of rich north African littoral.
• Played on stereotypes – Muslims couldn’t fight in cold, try Anatolia in winter
• Muslim decision to embark on combined naval and land strategies, esp. under sponsorship of Mu’awiya underscored readiness of Muslims to adapt new strategies and techniques of war.  Muslims still innovating and surprising their opponents.
• Creation of frontier – assisted consolidation of power and authority and ending state of extreme flux and rapid military change.  Define subjects of both governments and accelerated an imperfect homogenisation of the populations of both governments.
• Cyprus purchased peace, local governor, autonomously.  Shows danger of autonomous local government
• Heraclius and Umar and immediate successors managed t assert central control over new developing frontier
• Frontier between Byzantium and the caliphate remain unstable and suspicious.
• Byzantine mistakes – Impossible to state whether
• Byzantine failed to develop an effective strategy to cope quickly and decisively with Muslim propensity to concentrate attacks on poorly guarded periphery nodal points – rather than centres of population – responsibility for civilians may actually have reduced freedom to conduct military operations – unprepared and untrained to deal with invasion, no coherent Byzantine strategy.
• Byzantium lacked human and material resources to holds Byzantine and Persians together. Needed calling on Arab tribes to do this.  No evidence of Heraclius attempting to train civilian population
• State prevents individuals from holding arms – yes successful against internal revolt, but might have encouraged violent resistance against Muslims – would they have done so?
• Start Muslim conquests  -despite Avaric and Salvic raids and protracted war with Persians – economic resources still far greater than those of Muslims at start of the conquests.  Byzantines unable to convert them into a decisive military advantage – Heraclius trying to juggle too many commitments on the periphery of the Empire.
• Sheer quantitative superiority in economic resources did not insure ultimate military victory.  One material resource, territorial depth did allow possibility of survival and partial recovery.
• Technological advantage – siege warfare and Graeco-Roman tradition – as opposed to camel. – Muslim handbook implicitly concedes technological superiority.
• Decisive in confirming loss Byzantine territories in the levant was succession crisis after Heraclius’ death 641 – General Valentinus revolt further exacerbates internal strife – controversial second marriage to niece Martina – rivalry of children for emperor – environment for rational and cool decision making difficult.   Internal struggles and ecclesiastical ones divert leading officials attentions from critical military situations on various exposed borders – 637 – 41 internal wrangles divert attention from Muslim threat during – lingered beyond government’s suppression of another rebellion 642.
• Inability to gain initiative, move readily and project power during course of military operations from start of Muslim invasions – too often reactive or passive.  Conscious or unconscious ceding of the initiative to Muslims contributed to defeats.
• No great new heroes or commanders, no strategist
• Underestimation of Muslims to use cunning and Byzantines thought they were the masters of this
• Absence of Christian religious motivation comparable to Islam – major factor Byzantine loss – no Christian calls to protect towns.  Chalceodnian or Meonthelite clergy not diehard resistors of Muslim armies 0 did not succeed in creating will ad morale within Christian population, even of walled towns, to resist for a protracted period.
• Did not actively help Muslims – did not strenuously encourage communicants to resist Muslims to the death.
• Not surprising to see leaders of towns negotiating own peace – following earlier precedents in the region – no greater or less than it had been in 630s or 640s
• Psychological momentum for Muslims from small victories – reverse for Byzantines – inevitability and defeatism.
• Religious in fighting cannot have helped to coordinate effective resistance against Muslims – not decisive element in causing the Byzantine failure and Muslim success.
• Social conditions in Syria, Palestine an Mesopotamia create environment in which Byzantine armies and their commanders tried to function and cope
• ROLE OF ISLAM -  bolstering “practical resolve of the elite to embark on an expansion”
• Byzantine leaders often attempted to pursue a policy of divide and rule – sowing dissension within ranks and leadership of enemies
• Religious strength made it more difficult for Byzantines to use traditional methods of causing desertion, side switching and betrayal within ranks of Muslims.  Byzantines suffered more losses to due to desertion than Muslims did
• Forced Byzantine to attempt battle impossible to use bribery, guile and emissaries to break cohesion of Muslims.  Muslims then choose battle sites – B’s never done this, fought on their terms.
• Does not imply religious fanaticism but religious motivation from the leaders.
• Never expected such an attack from such an area = Islam untied and motivated hitherto disunited elements of Arabian society – used to be purely Beduin raids.
• Suffered badly from Arab desertions at battle of Yarmuk
• No great historian emerged from these wars
• Poor intelligence on the Muslims and failure to act rapidly, properly and decisively on what intelligence they did acquire about Muslims – underestimate religious motivation
• 4^th, 5^th and 6^th century deficiencies highlighted again – inclination to stay behind walls, numerous gaps in defences – feebleness of Byzantine defences there all along, why not earlier
• Byzantine efforts to maintain comms with Egypt compete for resources with Muslims frontier.
• Poor reputation of Byzantines – plundering a region before they left it, unlike exemplary behaviour of the Muslims – much physical damage in aftermath of conquests Byzantine scorched earth policies.
• Heraclian dynasty continues to 711
• Shows administrative system ripe for change – government lacked monetary funds, reliance on local officials for loyalty and supplies unreliable and prone to sabotage
• Vitality – religious, social and economic – Islam, rleigous events and change provide decisive catalyst – situation 640 not foreseeable in 629
• Moment of weakness – 629/30 – Byzantine authority process of being restores

Other Notes in this Category

1. army – its size and effectiveness for the defense of the eastern borders
2. Birth of the Islamic State
3. Byzantine authority and the nomads – divergent views
4. Byzantine reliance on arab military resistance
5. Byzantium and the early islamic conquests
6. Caliphate of ali – 656 – 661
7. Conquest and division in the time of the rashidun caliphs
8. Difficulty in devising defence for Syria
9. Elements of Failure and Endurance
10. End of the Ancient Economy
11. Foundation of the marwand caliphate and the achievemnet of ‘abd al-malik
12. Islamic conquests
13. Limitations defense-in-depth strategy
14. Military leadership of heraclius
15. relevance of recent war with persia
16. Richard n. frye – arab conquests in iran
17. State of strategy and warfare
18. The matric of the muslim world:
19. The umayyad caliphate
20. Umar and the early islamic conquests – 634 – 644
21. Whittow – making of byzantium

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