Chapter 4: Of the Limits to the Authority of Society over the Individual
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Chapter 4: Of the Limits to the Authority of Society over the Individual
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-         ‘To individuality should belong the part of life in which it is chiefly the individual that is interested; to society, the part which chiefly interests society’.

-          No good purpose is answered by inventing a contract in order to deduce social obligations from it, but ‘every one who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit’: i.) ‘in not injuring… certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights’; and ii.) each ‘bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labours and sacrifices incurred for defending society or its members from injury and molestation.  These conditions society is justified in enforcing at all costs to those who endeavour to withhold fulfilment’.

-          Sometimes indivs act bad but don’t violate constituted rights – they may then be justly punished by opinion, though not by law.  ‘As soon as any part of an individual’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it’.

-          Question of whether general welfare is promoted then OK (likely benefits/costs of action) but not if indiv’s actions only affects his own interests. 

-          Why shouldn’t we force people in matters concerning their own interests?:

-          1.  ‘He is the person most interested in his own well-being’.

-          2.  His knowledge of his own feelings and circumstances surpasses ‘immeasurably… those that can be possessed by any one else’

-          3.  Soc’s interference in overruling his judgement & purposes in what only regards himself ‘must be grounded on general presumptions; which may be altogether wrong, and even if right, are as likely as not to be misapplied to individual cases’  We can exhort him (even obtrude exhortations) but he’s final judge. 

-          4.  ‘All errors which he’s likely to commit against advice and warning are far outweighed by the evil of allowing others to constrain him to what they deem his good’. (can’t we question all of these?)

-          If folly due to lowness or depravation of taste, it’s a service to him to warn him of it beforehand + have right to avoid his soc (but not to parade this), can warn others of him &, except where they tend to lead to his improvement, give others preference over him ‘in optional good offices’.

-          Encroachment on other people’s rights: ‘these are fit objects of moral reprobation, and, in grave cases, of moral retribution and punishment’.

-          If he displeases us, we may express distaste/stand aloof – but don’t feel called on to make his life uncomfortable.  ‘If he spoils his life by mismanagement, we shall not, for that reason, desire to spoil it still further’ but should seek to help.  If he harms others Society, as the protector of all its members, must retaliate on him

-          Possible Objection 1: Isn’t this unrealistically atomistic view of soc: ‘No person is an entirely isolated being; it is impossible for a person to do anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himself, without mischief reaching… often far beyond him’.  E.g. physical, material deterioration: dependent family members & soc. he owes services; & others too – he may ‘be injurious by his example; and ought to be compelled to control himself, for the sake of those whom the sight or knowledge of his conduct might mislead’

-          Possible Objection 2: even if the consequences of individual misconduct could  be restricted to the vicious or thoughtless individual, ‘ought society to abandon to their own guidance those who are manifestly unfit for it?’.  If prot vs themselves is due to children & under age,  isn’t soc equally bound to do the same for people equally incapable of self-government?  If gambling/drunkenness as injurious to happiness & as great a hindrance to  improvement as many things prohibited by law, shouldn’t we, subject to ‘practicability and social convenience’, also use law for these things.  And also (law imperfect) have a social role too: no question of these things (tried and condemned) being useful or suitable to any person’s individuality. 

-          Mill’s Response‘When, by conduct of this sort, a person is led to violate a distinct and assignable obligation to any other person or persons, the case is taken out of the self-regarding class, and becomes amenable to moral disapprobation in the proper sense of the term.’ E.g. if extravagant (saddle family with debt – reprobation and might be justly punished for harm to family).  ‘Whoever fails in the consideration generally due to the interests and feelings of others, not being compelled by some more imperative duty, or justifies by allowable self-preference, is a subject of moral disapprobation for that failure, but not for the cause of it, nor for the errors, merely personal to himself, which may have remotely led to it.’ – shouldn’t be punished for being drunk per se: but yes if soldier/policeman on duty.  If people incapable of governing themselves: ‘society only has itself to blame for the consequences’ (had absolute power over them in childhood to make them capable of rational conduct in life: had power of education & the ascendancy which received opinion exercises over minds least fitted to judge for themselves, natural penalties (contempt, distaste).  It’s true that people have an  example which has bad/ pernicious effect on others.  But here’s the crux: ‘But we are now speaking of conduct which, while it does no wrong to others, is supposed to do great harm to the agent himself: and I do not see how those who believe this, can think otherwise that the example, on the whole, must be more salutary than hurtful, since, if it displays the misconduct, it displays also the painful or degrading consequences which, if it displays the misconduct, it displays also the painful and degrading consequence which… must be supposed in all or most cases attendant on it’.  Also, the ‘strongest’ argument vs such social interference is that when it concerns purely personal conduct, odds are that society ‘interferes wrongly, & in  the wrong place’: public often only consider their own prefs & are indiff to the pleasures & convenience for person concerned: e.g. ‘a religious bigot, when charged with disregarding the religious feelings of others, has been known to retort that they disregard his feelings by persisting in their abominable worship or creed’

-          Mill gives some e.gs of intolerance: i.) Country where Muslims are in maj: would be wrong for them to prohibit pork eating within boundaries of their country (even if they find it revolting & believe that it’s forbidden by the Deity).  Mill says it’s not rel persecution, even if rel in origin, since, no-one’s rel makes it a duty to eat pork, but ‘the only tenable ground of condemnation would be, that with personal tastes and self-regarding concerns of individuals the public has no business to interfere’. ii.) Only Cat’m allowed in Spain: bad.  iii.) Puritans, if in maj. would be wrong for them to prohibit public and private amusements.  iv.) Speaks vs prohibition in US and vs the ‘Alliance’ against it in the UK.  (p89) – argument he uses is that the principle used by its secretary to justify it (who claims the right to legislate whenever a person’s actions  invade his highly extensive ‘social rights’) untenable – (is he dodging the issue?…)  v.) speaks vs Sabbatarian legislation: the pleasure/ useful recreation ‘of many, is worth the labour of a few, provided the occupation is freely chosen, and can be freely resigned’ – thus the only ground for such legislation (Sunday recreation) must be that they are religiously wrong, ‘a motive of legislation which can never be too earnestly protested  against. … The notion that it is one man’s duty that another should be religious, was the foundation of all religious persecutions ever perpetrated, and if admitted, would fully justify them.’.  vi.) Though makes clear his distaste of Mormonism, provided voluntary (so practitioners don’t ask for outside help), would be a direct infraction of the lib princip for those totally unconnected to communities to impose ban on this practise on Mormons.

 

Other Notes in this Category

  1. Chapter 1: Introductory
  2. Chapter 2: On the Liberty of Thought and Discussion
  3. Chapter 3: Of Individuality, as one of the Elements of Well-Being
  4. Chapter 4: Of the Limits to the Authority of Society over the Individual
  5. Chapter 5: Applications

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